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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JIMMIE N. REIDHEAD, NYLE C. 
BIGELOW, GLENN McKEE, Uintah 
County Commissioners, WESTERN 
SURETY CO., bondsman 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CASE NO. 900347 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 
by the Uintah County Attorney, in the name of Uintah County, 
against the three Defendant Commissioners and their bondsman, 
praying for recovery of damages for the County in the amount of 
$13,000.00, alleging that the Defendant Commissioners had awarded 
a contract to Arlo Dean dba Arlo's M & R in the amount of 
$62,985.00 which was more than double the lowest bid of $28,000.00 
without preparing specifications and advertising as required by law 
and without requiring a performance bond. Defendants answered by 
denying the allegations and moved for Summary Judgment asserting 
the actions of the Defendant were taken in good faith. Depositions 
were taken, affidavits filed and following oral argument, Judge 
Dennis L. Draney of the Eighth Judicial District Court of Uintah 
County, statement after which Judge Draney awarded Summary Judgment 
to Defendants stating that no evidence was shown of bad faith on 
the part of Defendants and that Defendants were entitled to Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law, of which Judgment Appellant Appeals. 
(Appellant will refer to the facts in more detail in its 
argument and when it does so, it will cite the particular reference 
by page or otherwise from the record.) 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant text of statues and rules pertinent to resolving this 
case will be cited here and verbatim text included in an addendum 
attached hereto. These are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 
2. Utah Code Annotated 17-15-3 
3. Utah Code Annotated 14-1-18 
4. Utah Code Annotated 63-56-38(1)(a) 
5. Rule 56 of U.R.C.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This action is brought by the Uintah County Attorney pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12 of the Laws of the State of Utah in 
the name of Uintah County against the three Uintah County 
Commissioners and their Bondsman, seeking to recover damages for 
the County in the amount of $13,000.00 as a result of the said 
Uintah County Commission awarding a contract for the repair of the 
Uintah County Court roof and Uintah County Care Center Roof in the 
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amount of $62,985.00 to Arlo Dean, dba Arlo's M & R, an unlicensed 
contractor and without preparing specifications and advertising 
bids as required by law (Utah Code Annotated 17-15-3) and without 
requiring a performance bond as required by law, (Utah Code 
Annotated 14-1-8) and providing workman's compensation for his 
employees as required by law. Also, in view of the fact that the 
said bid was more than two times the lowest bid submitted of 
$28,000.00, awarded Judgment to Defendant of which Judgment the 
Plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
1. Does the evidence presented show conclusively that when 
viewed in the most favorable light there is no issue of material 
fact remaining such as would preclude Defendant and Appellees being 
awarded a Summary Judgment as a matter of law? 
2. In the exercise of a discretionary duty can it be said 
that Defendants acted in good faith when they knowingly and in a 
manner showing gross negligence awarded this contract and therefore 
removed the shield of Immunity for their actions? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant will take exception to the Court's ruling, 
contending with detailed references therefrom that record of the 
case will show several issues that will raise questions of law that 
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cannot be summarily disposed of in view of the fact that viewed in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing Summary Judgment there 
are no material facts at issue. In summary Appellant notes several 
issues that will be discussed and elaborated with particular 
reference in its detailed argument. 
Appellant will further argue that sufficient facts and 
precedent may be alluded to show that even though the Commissioners 
were performing a discretionary duty, that they knowingly exercised 
the same in a manner that was a clear violation of the law and 
therefore they lost their shield of immunity under the laws and the 
same actions manifest a gross negligence from an issue may be 
raised that they have not acted in good faith. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT'S RULING DOES NOT SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT THERE 
ARE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINING TO BE DECIDED AND 
THEREFORE, DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Before approaching specifically this issue, Appellant makes 
the following general observations. It will be noted that 
according to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that a 
moving party is entitled to Summary Judgment which states (noting 
the pertinent portion of Rule 56(c) 
"The Judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith, if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers, interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to Judgment as a matter of law." 
Viewing the matter in further context the Court has held that 
in rendering Summary Judgment, it is not to determine the weight 
of the testimony or credibility of witnesses (Singleton v. 
Alexander, 19 U 2d 291, 431 P2d 126; Sandburg v Klien, 576 P2d 
1201). Moreover, the Court is not to determine what the facts are 
but must note whether there is a material issue of fact (Hill ex 
rel Fooel v Grand Central Inc.. 25 U2d 121, 477 P2d 150). 
Similarly any issue of Doubt is to be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party (Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P2d 434). Having 
viewed the ruling of the Court in the light of these observations, 
Appellant finds from the pleadings on file several issues material 
fact upon which a question of whether Defendants acted in good 
faith might be raised. 
A question of material fact was presented with respect, when 
as a defense that the Commission was to follow the policy and 
procedures of the County with regard to the same, the record shows 
they did not follow that procedure as evidenced by the testimony 
of the proposals in response to a question as to whether he 
solicited bids, or was asked about bids, he responded in the 
negative (Deposition Dean Pope, P. 4-5). Moreover, he was asked 
about preparing bids, he indicated were prepared by Jim Shewell 
(Deposition Dean Pope, P. 5) and again referring to page 6 of the 
same deposition the following is noted: that he made no 
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consultation with the bidders (P. 6) he issued purchase orders for 
the contractor, after the contractor had taken the bid (P. 7 of the 
same). 
The minutes of the Commission Meeting reveal that the bid was 
purportedly awarded to Arlo's M & R, yet only the labor was awarded 
to him, the materials were contracted to SWEPCO (Minutes of 
Commission Meeting, August 8, 1989). Referring to the deposition 
of Jim Shewell, Building Superintendent, we noted the following in 
response to Defendants question: 
Q. And then, subsequent to that did you have 
any, it didn't involve only labor? 
A. When we came to signing the contract 
and writing the P.O.'s is when it 
came out and Dean was upset over it 
because he says the County doesn't 
do business that way." (P. 11 Dean 
Pope is County Purchasing Agent) 
Further in the same deposition he testified, referring to Dean 
Pope, "he indicated the County didn't do business that way, that 
usually it represented the total cost and so I guess it was 
mentioned to the Commissioners and through Glen and that they 
agreed to go where the County would purchase the materials and just 
make P.O.'s (P. 11). These facts should be noted in view of the 
fact that at Commissioner McKee's urging they had met with Arlo 
Dean prior to the awarding of the bid (Arlo Dean's Affidavit on 
file). 
The affidavits of all three Commissioners indicate that they 
delegated the authority to prepare specifications for bids to Jim 
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Shewell and Dean Pope, authority that is derived from Utah Code 
Annotated 17-15-4, and noting appointment under this section it 
must be inferred that they were aware of Utah Code Annotated 17-
15-3 that relates to requirements of advertising and performance 
bond for all bids. 
Finally, the record shows that both Commissioner Bigelow (Nyle 
Bigelow Deposition P.13) noted that an attempt was made to rescind 
the agreement with Arlo Dean and have him perform under proxy 
contract with Loran Allred (confirmed deposition Glen McKee, P 18-
19) and Affidavit of Arlo Dean: 
From these facts and more there are issues raised that would 
preclude granting of Summary Judgment on the assumption there was 
no issue of a material fact relating to good faith exercised of 
their discretion, 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS, WHILE PERFORMING A DISCRETIONARY DUTY, KNOWINGLY 
EXERCISED THAT DISCRETION ARBITRARILY IN AN ILLEGAL AND ARBITRARY 
MANNER AND THEREFORE SUCH IS EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF GOOD FIATH, 
REMOVING THE SHIELD OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY THAT COVERS THEM AND THE 
EXERCISE OF THAT DUTY. 
In approaching the question as to whether the Commissioners 
acted performing a discretionary duty rather than administerial 
duty. Appellant concedes and further concurs with the established 
Utah law that accords a qualified immunity to public officials when 
they so act (Snvder v. Merkley, 693 P2d 64; Salt Lake County v. 
Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075). But, the Courts have ruled that 
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Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P 1075). But, the Courts have ruled that 
not even a discretionary function is to be exercised in an 
arbitrary manner quoting the Court, ruling on another question the 
following is noted: 
"[Discretion. . .does not mean absolute 
arbitrary power. The discretion must be 
exercised in a reasonable manner, and not 
maliciously, wantonly, arbitrarily to the wrong 
and injury of another" (Murphy v. Grand County, 
1 U2d 412, 68 P2d 677) 
While the ruling and facts of that case are not quite 
applicable in the instant situation, the case does suggest that in 
awarding contracts in an overt improper manner, such unreasonable 
action constitutes an abuse of discretion. While a perusal of the 
cases of jurisdictions implying the "good faith immunity" there is 
a tendency "to defer to the Judgment and actions of public 
officials." 
Yet, there have been some exceptions notably a North Carolina 
case relating to expenditure of public funds improperly spent on 
a contract not let out for public bid and ruling on a verdict of 
a jury that the public official involved the Mayor, "unlawfully, 
willfully, and knowingly let...(the contract) with the intent to 
evade the law with regard to advertisements and public letting of 
municipal contracts" (Moore v. Lambeth 207 N.C. 23 175 S.E. 714 at 
175 S.E. 715) the Court rejected the Mayor's claim that no 
liability attached because his actions were taken in his official 
capacity which contention the North Carolina Court rejected because 
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the Plaintiff's ere not seeking recovery as individuals but were 
acting in behalf of the City. 
With regard to the question of good faith, there is a dearth 
of case law delineating what is implied by the term, but a Georgia 
Court attempted definition when it stated that: 
f,[b]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or 
negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or 
some moral obliquity and implies conscious 
doing of wrong, and means a breach of known 
duty through some motive of interest or ill 
will. 
"Bad faith" though and indefinite term, differs 
from the negative idea of negligence, in that 
it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively 
operating with a furtive design or some motive 
or interest of ill will." 
Following the case law, there seems to be no cases directly 
ruling on the question of whether bad faith may be attributed to 
grossly negligent conduct, in a Montana Case (Goetschius v. Lasich, 
138 Mont. 465, 353 P2d 87), they alluded to this fact when 
landowners sued the County Commission for flood damage allegedly 
arising from the County's construction of a drainage ditch, the 
Court noted action would not lie for the "[1] negligent performance 
of an official duty, which is judicial and discretionary in its 
nature, however gross or corrupt such neglect maybe..." There is 
however authority to the effect that officers exercising 
discretionary powers may be held liable for...a gross neglect of 
duty." 
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Albeit, the Court did not find gross negligence in this case 
nor has it been subsequently followed. Further a doctrine of 
immunity has developed which shields public officials form civil 
liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable 
person would have known. But, this doctrine serves to remove the 
shield of immunity when an official is aware of the statutory 
standard to which he is expected to adhere. (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800). 
While this doctrine has not been extended beyond the area of 
monetary damages in constitutional rights violations (see eg 
Sampson v. King 693 F2d 566, Green v. White, 693 F2d 45) by 
analogous might extend to the case at bar. 
In summonation, in applying the "good faith" exception to the 
case at bar, we have an anomaly not apparent in most of the cases 
of issue. In the cases of Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P2d 64, and Salt 
Lake v. Clinton, 30 Utah 462, we are dealing with matters of a 
single infraction, but in the present case, not only do we have an 
instance of the Commissioners letting a bid with public notice, to 
an unlicensed contractor, for an amount more than double the lowest 
bid, without a written contract, but the Commissioners 
misrepresented the bid by announcing the bid was for the whole of 
the contract, when it was merely for labor, then in violation of 
its own policies and procedures, it committed the County to issuing 
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circumvent and cover up its error by drafting a rescission 
agreement and arranging for the original contractor to perform on 
a proxy contract. In this, anomalous situation where there was a 
persistent disregard of known laws and policy, the breach is so 
gross and flagrant that the Court could find there is grounds for 
inferring the Commission did not act in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
In recapping the previous discussion; it will be noted that 
the Court ruled for Summary Judgment without taking the matter 
under advisement. From the record of the case there are numerous 
issues of fact that emerge from the evidence in the pleading, 
certainly enough to suggest issues of fact that further testimony 
might show a lack of good faith on the part of Defendants. 
Furthermore as relates to the good faith issue there are 
evidences from the testimony of a flagrant arbitrary exercise of 
a discretionary duty of a magnitude that ought to suggest that the 
Defendants were not performing in accordance with the canons of 
good faith. To deprive the Appellant who represents the public 
weal of the opportunity to produce that evidence in a trial, is 
contravention of the intent of the good faith exception as applied 
to Utah Code Annotated 17-5-12. The Court should overrule the 
Summary Judgment and remand it to the Court for Trial upon the 
11 
Summary Judgment and remand it to the Court for Trial upon the 
issues. 
DATED this 7 day of September, 1990 
CUV IN C'NASl 
Attorney/for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to David L. Church, Attorney for Appellant, 51 East 400 South, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
DATED this " 7 ^ day of September, 199 
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COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 17-5-12 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 502; C.L. 
1917, § 1378; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 1959. 
17-5-10, 17-5-11. Repealed. 
Repeals. Sections 17-5-10 and 17-5-11 (R.S. 
1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 503, 504; C.L. 1917, 
§§ 1379, 1380; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5,10, 
19-5-11), relating to personal interests of mem-
bers of the board of county commissioners in 
county contracts, franchises or licenses, were 
repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 128, § 15. For 
present provisions, see § 67-16-1 et seq. 
17-5-12. Moneys unlawfully paid — Recovery 
ing payment. 
Restrain-
Whenever any board of county commissioners shall without authority of 
law order any money paid for any purpose and such money shall have been 
actually paid, or whenever any other county officer has drawn any warrant in 
his own favor or in favor of any other person without being authorized thereto 
by the board of county commissioners or by law and the same shall have been 
paid, the county attorney of such county shall institute suit in the name of the 
county against such person or such officer and his official bondsman to recover 
the money so paid, and when the money has not been paid on such order or 
warrants, the county attorney of such county upon receiving notice thereof 
shall commence suit in the name of the county to restrain the payment of the 
same; no order of the board of county commissioners shall be necessary in 
order to maintain either of such actions. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 506; C.L. 
1917, § 1382; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-5-12. 
Cross-References. — Uniform fiscal proce-
dures for counties, § 17-36-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Personal liability of commissioners. 
Procedure for bringing action. 
Personal liability of commissioners. 
County commissioners could not be held per-
sonally liable, in absence of fraud or corrup-
tion, for unauthorized allowance of claim for 
publication of a list of delinquent taxes without 
having first invited bids for publication since 
the hearing and determination by commis-
sioners of justness or validity of claim in the 
question required exercise of judicial, or, at 
least, quasi-judicial functions of board. Salt 
Lake County v. Clinton, 39 Utah 462, 117 P. 
1075 (1911). 
Procedure for bringing action. 
In an action under this section to recover un-
lawfully paid money, the county attorney of 
the county wherein it was alleged that the 
funds were illegally expended must be a party 
to bring action, and action must be in the name 
of the county. Snyder v. Cook (Utah 1984) 688 
P.2d 496. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties § 98. 
Key Numbers. — Counties *=» 59. 
267 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 17-15-3 
17-12-1, Authority and applicable procedure for issuance 
of bonds — Application of proceeds — Debt limit. 
Except as otherwise provided under Section 17-4-4, the county governing 
body may contract a bonded indebtedness in the manner and subject to the 
conditions provided under the Utah Municipal Bond Act. The revenue derived 
from the sale of bonds shall be applied only to the purpose or purposes speci-
fied in the order of the board. If there is any surplus, it shall be applied to the 
payment of the bonds. In no event may any county become so indebted to an 
amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding 2% of the fair market 
value, as defined under Section 59-2-102, of the taxable property in the county 
as computed from the last equalized assessment roll for county purposes prior 
to the incurring of the indebtedness. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CL. 1907, § 518; L. 
1917, ch. 97, § 1; CL. 1917, § 1414; R.S. 1933 
& C 1943, 19-10-1; L. 1957, ch. 33, § 1; 1963, 
ch. 27, § 1; 1970, ch. 6, § 2; 1985, ch. 165, 
I 27; 1987, ch. 4, § 15; 1988, ch. 3, § 64. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, in the first 
sentence substituted "county governing body" 
for "board of county commissioners", in the 
fourth sentence substituted "fair market value, 
as established under § 59-2-103," for "reason-
able fair cash value"; and made various stylis-
tic changes throughout the section 
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9, 
1988, substituted "defined under Section 
59-2-102" for "established under Section 
59-2-103" in the final sentence 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch 4, § 307 provides that this section has ret-
rospective operation to January 1, 1987 
Laws 1988, ch 3, fc 269 provides that the act 
"has retrospective operation to January 1, 
1988 " 
CHAPTER 15 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Section 
17-15-3 Erection and repair of public 
buildings or bridges — Con-
tracts — Bids — Payment and 
performance bonds — Retain-
age escrow 
Section 
17-15-4 
17-15-5 
17-15-17 
Approval of cost-increase changes 
in plans and specifications — 
Delegation 
Changes or alterations in contract 
— Liability of count} 
Count} expenses enumerated 
17-15-3. Erection and repair of public buildings or bridges 
— Contracts — Bids — Payment and perfor-
mance bonds — Retainage escrow. 
(1) (a) Until plans and specifications have been made and adopted by the 
county governing body, the governing body may not erect or repair, or 
contract for the erection or repair of, any courthouse, jail, hospital, or 
other public building or bridge where the expenditure exceeds: 
(i) $12,000 in any county of the first or second class, 
(ii) $10,000 in any county of the third or fourth class; 
(iii) $8,000 in any county m any of the remaining classes 
(b) All buildings and bridges shall be erected or repaired by contract let 
to the lowest responsible bidder after publication of notice at least once a 
week for three consecutive \veeks m a newspaper of general circulation 
89 
17-15-4 COUNTIES 
published in the county, or, if there is no such newspaper, then after 
posting such notice for at least 20 days in at least five public places in the 
county. 
(c) The county governing body may reject any or all bids. 
(d) The person to whom any contract to erect or repair buildings and 
bridges is awarded shall execute bonds under Sections 14-1-18 and 
63-56-38. 
(2) (a) Any payment on a contract with a private contractor to erect or 
repair buildings and bridges under this section that is retained or with-
held shall be placed in an interest bearing account. 
(b) The interest shall accrue for the benefit of the contractor and sub-
contractors to be paid after the project is completed and accepted by the 
county governing body. 
(c) The contractor shall ensure that any interest accrued on the retain-
age is distributed by the contractor to subcontractors on a pro rata basis. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 524; C.L. tract" and made minor stylistic changes in 
1917, § 1420; L. 1919, ch. 30, § 1; R.S. 1933 & such subsection. 
C. 1943,19-11-3; L. 1947, ch. 24, § l;1973,ch. The 1988 amendment, effective March 10, 
23, § 1; 1983, ch. 60, § 15; 1987, ch. 218, § 5; 1988, rewrote this section 
1988, ch. 71, § 1. Applicability. — Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
 provjdes that Chapter 218 applies only to con-
ment, in the last sentence of Subsection (1)
 t r a c t s execuied o n o r a f t e r A p r i l 27, 1987, and 
S o ^ o ^ r ^°nuS , U n u §§ 14_1 j18u au to persons and bonds in connection with such 63-56-38 for a bond to be approved by the 
board for the faithful performance of such con- contracts. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Public contracts: authority of state Standing of disappointed bidder on public 
or its subdivision to reject all bids, 52 contract to seek damages under 42 USCS 
A.L.R.4th 186 § 1983 for public authorities' alleged violation 
Public contracts: low bidder's monetary re- of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 904. 
lief against state or local agency for nonaward 
of contract, 65 A.L.R.4th 93. 
17-15-4. Approval of cost-increase changes in plans and 
specifications — Delegation. 
(1) Whenever the county governing body adopts plans and specifications for 
the erection, alteration, construction, or repair of any public building, bridge, 
or other public structure, the plans and specifications may not be altered or 
changed in any manner that would increase the cost of erecting, altering, 
constructing, or repairing the building, bridge, or structure, unless the gov-
erning body first orders by unanimous vote that the plans and specifications 
be altered or changed. 
(2) The governing body may adopt policies and procedures to delegate au-
thority to approve alterations or changes in plans and specifications to a 
county employee, including the county engineer, architect, or surveyor, or the 
division or department director. 
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History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 525; C.L. Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
1917, § 1421; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 19-11-4; L. ment, effective March 10, 1988, rewrote this 
1988, ch. 71, § 2. section. 
17-15-5. Changes or alterations in contract — Liability of 
county. 
(1) Whenever the county governing body enters into a contract for the erec-
tion, construction, alteration, or repair of any public building, bridge, or other 
public structure, the contract may be altered or changed only: 
(a) by unanimous vote of the governing body; and 
(b) with the consent of the contractor. 
(2) Whenever any change or alteration in the contract is ordered: 
(a) the particular change or alteration shall be specified in writing; and 
(b) the governing body and the contractor shall agree to any cost in-
curred due to the change or alteration. 
(3) (a) The board may adopt policies and procedures to delegate authority 
for change order approvals to a county employee, including the county 
engineer, architect, surveyor, or the division or department director. 
(b) Unless the requirements of this section are met, the county govern-
ing body is not liable for any extra work done on the buildings or public 
structures. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 526; C.L. Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
1917, § 1422; R.S. 1933 & C 1943,19-11-5; L. ment, effective March 10, 1988, rewrote this 
1988, ch. 71, § 3. section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of construction contract with state or its subdivi-
"changed conditions" clause in public works or sion, 56 A.L.R.4th 1042. 
17-15-6. Purchase of stationery supplies — Notice to bid-
ders. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Standing of disappointed bidder on olation of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 
public contract to seek damages under 42 904. 
USCS § 1983 for public authorities' alleged vi-
17-15-8. Bids for notices and advertising. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Standing of disappointed bidder on olation of bidding procedures, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 
public contract to seek damages under 42 904. 
USCS § 1983 for public authorities' alleged vi-
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TITLE 14 
CONTRACTORS' BONDS 
Chapter 
1. Public Contracts. 
2. Private Contracts. 
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Section Section 
14-1-13 to 14-1-17. Repealed 14-1-19 Failure of government entity to ob-
14-1-18 Definitions — Application of Pro- tain payment bond — Right of ac-
curement Code to payment and tion — Notice 
performance bonds 14-1-20 Preliminary notice requirement 
14-1-13 to 14-1-17. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch 218, § 13 repeals and payment bonds on public projects, effective 
§§ 14-1-13 to 14-1-17, as enacted by Laws April 27, 1987 For present comparable provi-
1983, ch 61, §§ 1 to 5, relating to performance sions, see §§ 14-1-18, 14-1-19 
14-1-18. Definitions — Application of Procurement Code 
to payment and performance bonds. 
(1) (a) For purposes of this chapter, "political subdivision" means any 
county, city, town, school district, public transit district, special district, 
redevelopment agency, public corporation, institution of higher education 
of the state, public agency of any political subdivision, and, to the extent 
provided by law, any other entity which expends public funds for con-
struction. 
(b) For purposes of applying Section 63-56-38 to a political subdivision, 
"state" includes "political subdivision " 
(2) Section 63-56-38 applies to all contracts for the construction, alteration, 
or repair of any public building or public work of the state or a political 
subdivision of the state 
History: C. 1953, 14-1-18, enacted by L. tracts executed on or after April 27, 1987, and 
1987, ch. 218, § 1. to persons and bonds in connection with such 
Applicability. — Laws 1987, ch 218, § 12 contracts 
provides that Chapter 218 applies only to con-
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63-56-37. Bid security requirements. 
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least 59c of the amount of the bid 
shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts. 
Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety company authorized to do 
business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form satisfactory to 
the state 
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set 
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to 
rules and regulations, it is determined that the failure to comply with the 
security requirements is nonsubstantial. 
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period speci-
fied in the invitation for bids, except as provided in section [Subsection] 
63-56-20(6). If a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action 
shall be taken against the bidder or the bid security. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1. 
63-56-38. Bonds necessary when contract is awarded. 
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following bonds or secu-
rity shall be delivered to the state and shall become binding on the parties 
upon the execution of the contract: 
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
the state; and 
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to 
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company 
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to 
the state, for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to 
the contractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work pro-
vided for in the contract. 
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or 
payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of the 
state. 
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or 
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract, in respect of which a 
payment bond is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full 
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or 
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made, may sue on 
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and 
may prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any person having a 
contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied 
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of 
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor 
and surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the 
claim is made. The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and 
the name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the 
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material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered or certified 
mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place the 
contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business. 
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district 
court of the county in which the construction contract was to be performed. No 
suit may be commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180 days 
after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. The obligee named in the 
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit. 
History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 75, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment deleted "and regulations" after "Rules" 
in Subsection (2); substituted "may sue" for 
"shall have the right to sue" in the first sen-
tence of Subsection (3); deleted "However" at 
the beginning of the second sentence of Subsec-
tion (3); inserted "and surety company" in the 
second sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "per-
sonally or" after "served" in the last sentence 
of Subsection (3); substituted "on the contrac-
tor" for "in an envelope addressed to the con-
tractor" in the last sentence of Subsection (3); 
inserted "and surety company" and "or surety 
company" in the last sentence of Subsection 
(3); deleted "but no suit shall be commenced 
later than one year from the date on which the 
last of the labor was performed or material was 
supplied by the person bringing the suit" at the 
end of the first sentence of Subsection (4); 
added the second sentence of Subsection (4); 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of proof 
Timeliness of action 
Work performed without contract. 
Burden of proof. 
In action by materialman on payment bond, 
materialman did not have the burden to prove 
that the materials furnished were actually de-
livered to the job site or that they were actu-
ally incorporated into the structure, but only 
that the materials were furnished in connec-
tion with the particular project. City Elec v. 
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1984) 
Timeliness of action. 
The appropriate test for determining 
whether an action on a payment bond was 
brought within the required statutory time pe-
riod was not the "substantial completion" date; 
it was rather whether the material in question 
was supplied as a part of the original contract 
or for the purpose of correcting defects or mak-
ing repairs following inspection of the project. 
City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 
1053 (Utah 1984). 
Work performed without contract. 
Where construction company proceeded to 
demolish race track and install a soccer field 
for Utah Golden Spikers and state of Utah 
without an executed agreement and without 
compliance with fc 64-1-4, there was no con-
tract with the 6tate of Utah by which it was 
obliged to require the Golden Spikers to fur-
nish performance and payment bonds. 
Breitling Bros Constr. v. Utah Golden 
Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979). 
63-56-39. Form of bonds — Effect of certified copy. 
The form of the bonds required by this part shall be established by rules and 
regulations. Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond 
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A 
certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execu-
tion, and delivery of the original. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Bngham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to ha\e been obtained because of attorne\ s 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
h a n v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Re\ 937 trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L R 3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
* V f l "1
 4*9 C J S Judgments ^ 187 to 218 f ^ r e t 0 ^ ™Uct °J aPPh«"ion f de-
A L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to ha- [ a u h J ^ g m e n t where notice is required only 
biht\ against defaulting defendant 8 A L R 3d b> c u s l o m > 2 8 A L R J d 1 3 8 3 
" - Q Failure of part> or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Ke> Numbers. — Judgment <&=> 92 to 134 
1272 
De 
hean „ 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
id\ of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
t* a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
firiume issue as to the amount of damages 
td» Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion und&r^this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
fc[*a] is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
tradings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
Practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
*•**} and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It 
1 thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
1
 ^'idl controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
^ jr< a^  are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
^ »w established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
'
 o r m
 °^ affidavits; further testimony; defense requ i red . Support-
l l . ^Pposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
"'
 6UC
" ^
a c t s a s would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
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